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PANEL DISCUSSION: REMEMBERING JUSTICE SCALIA IN IP
CASES
GRAEME DINWOODIE*
JUSTICE SCALIA’S TRADEMARK OPINIONS
When asked to discuss Justice Scalia’s trademark opinions, I thought I
might be in some difficulty: I didn’t instantly recall that many trademark
opinions that Justice Scalia had authored. The number does get bigger if
you’re willing to include opinions that involved any interpretation of the
Lanham Act, but these are probably driven by considerations that don’t tell
you much about Justice Scalia’s views of trademark law. In that category,
for example, I would put the College Savings Bank case on abrogation of
11th amendment immunity, which is not surprisingly driven by views of the
11th Amendment. And likewise, although Justice Scalia was not the author
of it, the potentially important dissent with Justice Thomas in the B&B case
was driven by views on the applicability of issue estoppel in the context of
administrative bodies. So you can find a larger universe of cases if one
expands the scope of cases that are treated as “Justice Scalia’s trademark
opinions.”
But I am going to focus on two opinions that Justice Scalia did author
for the Court in cases that deal with two important substantive issues of
trademark law. Those issues are: determining when a trademark exists, and
what is the scope of protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act—that
is, I will focus on Wal-Mart v. Samara from 2000 and Dastar from 2003.
After recalling the basic reasoning of both cases, I will address three
questions as regards each case. First, with hindsight, how significant were
these two opinions for trademark and unfair competition law? Second, can
one discern from those opinions a consistent philosophy towards trademark
and unfair competition law. And, third, given that Justice Scalia’s approach
to statutory interpretation has been written about heavily—indeed, he wrote
about it at length himself—do those cases either mirror or depart from his
normal methods of interpretation.
* University Professor at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, as well as the Intellectual Property
Chair at the University of Oxford. This article is adapted from remarks delivered on September 22, 2016,
at the Chicago-Kent Supreme Court IP Review. The panel was moderated by Joseph Oldaker, Nelson
Bumgardner PC.
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I start with a caution: any social scientist will tell you that taking two
data points, and trying to extrapolate, suggests that I might be way off the
mark in drawing any general lessons. But, I will throw some ideas out there
and perhaps they’ll be validated by the patent and other opinions being
discussed here.
Since these cases were decided some time ago, let me briefly summarize
the cases. In Wal-Mart v. Samara, the plaintiff argued that it had trade dress
rights in the product design of a particular children’s clothing in a seersucker
fashion, and that when Wal-Mart copied the designs, it engaged in trademark
infringement. The plaintiff also sued under copyright law, but that was not
directly before the Court. The issues on which certiorari was granted was
“what is the test by which to determine an inherently distinctive product
design.” A few years before, in Two Pesos, the Supreme Court had
acknowledged that trade dress could be inherently distinctive but had not
addressed how to determine whether any particular trade dress had that
status. In the meantime, the Circuits had gone in different directions trying
to answer that question.
As a preliminary matter, the oral argument in this case was interesting
given Justice Scalia’s historically active participation in oral argument.
Something happened at oral argument in Wal-Mart that I think heavily
determined the outcome of the case. You see, it mentioned in Justice Scalia’s
opinion. One of the tests being considered was from a CCPA case called
Seabrook; one of the parties and the government, in their amicus briefs, both
argued that the Court should endorse that test for determining inherent
distinctiveness. At the oral argument, the Deputy Solicitor General was
asked: “Well, how would you apply Seabrook in this case?” He answered,
basically, “I have no idea how this clothing design would fare under
Seabrook.” Justice Scalia considered this a sure sign that Seabrook was not
a very good test if one was concerned with offering producers and their
competitors with some degree of certainty. And given the problems with
finding a satisfactory test, the Court’s response may not be unsurprising: you
don’t need to know what the test is because we hold that there is no such
thing as inherently distinctive product design trade dress.
I’m not an unbiased observer on this question because twenty years ago
I wrote a very long article called “Reconceptualizing the Inherent
Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress.” So, my first response to
Wal-Mart was to think it was wrong, having just spent a lot of time
explaining how to embrace a different approach. Looking back 16 years
later, I’m more ambivalent about the significance of this case and whether it
was right or wrong. Wal-Mart was part of the more general effort to roll back
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from the high-water mark, if that’s the right term, of Two Pesos in 1992.
And, especially when you pair it with the TrafFix case, successfully argued
by John Roberts a year later on functionality, there is a consistent message.
Qualitex was probably a pivot point where the Court said, “Yes you can
protect color but only in certain circumstances;” Wal-Mart was the first
confirmation of the change in direction. This retrenchment against product
design trade dress has been very effective work over sixteen years in
stopping a very large number of nuisance claims. As a result—arguably, at
least, as a result—protection of design has shifted from the trademark
system, which was operating as a quasi-design system in the United States,
to the design patent system, which has been rejuvenated over the last decade,
and indeed perhaps also to copyright. This is interesting because in the next
session, we will have a discussion of two cases pending before the Court this
year: one on design patent and one on copyright protection of designs.
And if you look at Justice Scalia’s opinion in Wal-Mart, that is exactly
what he thought should have happened. He said that plaintiffs should not
worry about lesser protection by trade dress because they will still have
copyright and design patent. This was a very explicit part of what was his
driving force. So, the case arguably has achieved what Justice Scalia sought
out to achieve. And, on the whole, this has probably been a good
development in trademark law. I still think, unlike many American scholars,
that product design trade dress claims should be more viable than they are,
because consumers actually associate product shapes with source more than
conventional wisdom suggests. But on the whole, Wal-Mart was a
significant decision that pushed the law to where Justice Scalia wanted it to
be.
What do I get from the Wal-Mart opinion in terms of trademark
philosophy? One way to approach this question is to compare Two Pesos,
eight years before, in which Justice Scalia wrote a very short concurrence.
His concurrence was, in essence, “I agree with Justice White who has
reached this conclusion that you can have inherently distinctive trade dress,
though he has reached that result through purposive reading of the statute,
and reference to legislative history. And I agree with Justice Thomas’
separate opinion, in which he reaches the same conclusion based upon
analysis of the evolving common law, which he correctly says has been
reflected in, but not replaced by, the Lanham Act.”
Justice Thomas’ opinion in Two Pesos was to some extent an embrace
of the idea of the Lanham Act as a delegating statute, rather like some
antitrust legislation. It was not as full an embrace of that proposition as one
finds from, say, Judge Leval in the Second Circuit. But Justice Thomas
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certainly acknowledged that there was a role for judges in developing
trademark law in partnership with Congress. In short, the opinion suggested
a judicial role in lawmaking that was perhaps not what one would readily
associate with Justice Scalia (though antitrust is an interesting comparison).
Interestingly, when Justice Scalia in Wal-Mart gave reasons why there
was no possibility of inherently distinctive trade dress, he started with the
point that the text of the statute told him absolutely nothing—which is an
interesting proposition in any Scalia opinion. Although in the end, Justice
Scalia did use other parts of the statute to support the importance of the
distinction between inherent distinctiveness and acquired distinctiveness. He
also relied on the proposition, drawn from Justice Stevens’ separate opinion
in Two Pesos, that the standard for registerability under Section 2 of the
Lanham Act and protectability under Section 43(a) are largely the same. This
is going to be a live issue for the Washington Redskins, depending upon what
the Court decides in the pending Tam case. So, Wal-Mart is not a particularly
textualist opinion.
The second concern driving Justice Scalia in Wal-Mart—and this gets
back to the point of the question to the Deputy Solicitor-General at oral
argument—is the need of certainty in a competitive climate. Justice Scalia
thought that endorsing a test that could not easily be applied to the design in
the case before the Court suggested that cases involving assertions of
inherently distinctive design could rarely be resolved at the stage of summary
judgement, inviting too many nuisance lawsuits. Justice Scalia thought that
was anti-competitive—not because the meritless claim would succeed, but
that it could not easily be dismissed without substantial costs, giving rise to
hold-up potential.
Justice Scalia expressed the consumer interest tied up in that
competitiveness analysis as the interest in having lower-priced goods rather
than the interest in being protected from confusion—which is the consumer
interest that you tend see highlighted in trademark cases. So, what I see in
that opinion is a vision of trademark law as more than a mere consumer
protection law, which is of course one vision of trademark law. Justice Scalia
saw trademark law as part of broader industrial and economic policy, where
trademark law is concerned with the regulation of competition. I think that
you see this in Dastar as well, where certainty again loomed large.
A third driver of Wal-Mart is that Justice Scalia tried to see trademark
law as part of the larger intellectual property picture, including design patent
and copyright. And, again, he comes back to this in Dastar, so I will discuss
this in a moment.
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One final observation about Wal-Mart. Justice Scalia may not have
considered himself an expert in some of the scientific matters coming before
the Court in patent cases, but he saw himself as a prototypical consumer. He
displays this in both Wal-Mart and Dastar. In Wal-Mart, he commented that,
“It seems to us that consumers would not be predisposed to look at shape and
think of source.” And likewise, in Dastar, he says, “I don’t think the
consumer cares about the source of the content of a communicative product
such as a sound recording or movie.” Justice Scalia presented these views as
empiricism—in Wal-Mart, to justify not accepting the possibility of
inherently distinctive design trade dress. It’s an intriguing starting point,
though one that he backed up with a series of normative policy objections
that supported the conclusion he came to empirically. That reveals something
about distinctiveness that has too often been missed by American courts.
Distinctiveness is a mix of empirical and normative analysis. Justice Scalia
took into account empiricism, even if it came from his own “expertise,” but
colored that empirical analysis with awareness of normative concerns.
In Dastar, the copyright had expired on television programs that were
based upon a book about Eisenhower’s Crusades in Europe. Dastar acquired
the physical tapes that embodied the television series, edited them, and
repackaged them as their own. On the packaging, Dastar did not mention that
most of the content was produced by third parties in creating the television
series, the copyright in which, if it was in any way still extant, belonged to
Fox. The case was not brought as a copyright claim, however, because the
copyright in the television series had expired. Instead, the action is brought
as a so-called “false designation of origin” claim under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.
Putting aside the wisdom of allowing an unfair competition claim to
afford what is effectively copyright protection, Dastar is a disastrouslyreasoned decision on any number of grounds. But one ground is that the real
basis for the decision is obscured. For Justice Scalia, perhaps driven by his
textualism, the outcome turns on the dictionary definition of the term
“origin.” And that turns out to be the unhelpful focus of a series of Seventh
Circuit cases applying Dastar over the last couple of years.
Some of the same policy themes as we saw in Wal-Mart are also
evident, however. And it would have been more useful had these been front
and center. For example, we see again the concern of uncertainty. At oral
argument, counsel for Fox was asked, “If instead of not crediting you, Dastar
had credited you, wouldn’t you just sue them for false affiliation or
association of endorsement?” Counsel for Fox reassured that they would not
have done that. But under the plaintiff’s argument, they could have done that.
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It was a plausible claim. Thus, Dastar would be sued if they did one thing,
and sued if they did exactly the opposite. No competitors—operating legally
to work with public domain material—can exist in that climate. And, again
as in Wal-Mart, cumulation of rights was part of the picture; the Court was
not willing to allow the circumvention of copyright law, by endorsing what
it called a “mutant” copyright claim. This would have been the clearest basis
on which to ground the decision, but it was thrown in with a mix of textual
and other policy reasons. For example, again the driven is ostensibly
informed by Justice Scalia’s belief that consumers would not care who
actually came up with the ideas behind Crusades in Europe. All they were
concerned about was the physical tape. As an empirical observation about
movies, I find that hard to accept.
TEXTUALISM
The strictness of Justice Scalia’s adherence to textualism varies in the
two trademark cases I mentioned. Between Two Pesos and Wal-Mart, on the
one hand, and Dastar, on the other, Justice Scalia becomes far less
comfortable with the idea of the Lanham Act as a delegating statute. To be
fair, in Two Pesos and Wal-Mart, it would have been really hard to rely on
textualism. And in Wal-Mart, although he relied on general policy arguments
and purposive interpretation, he did try to find some textual reference points,
even though none directly answered the question. In Dastar, Justice Scalia
was able to find a textual hook, which was the word “origin.” However, if
you pled the Section 43(a) claims slightly differently, you could have
brought a claim invoking that provision without involving the word “origin;”
it’s actually not that hard to do that. But one of the problems that emanated
from Dastar is that once you have defined “origin” merely as it is found in
the dictionary—as the source of the tangible product on which a mark was
impressed—you create problems for cases arising in the 21st century. You
develop very wooden approaches to unfair competition cases. Instead, if
Justice Scalia had emphasized what was actually going on in Dastar—this
was clearly an attempt to circumvent the fact that you had a copyrighted
work that was in the public domain—and relied on the policy prohibition
against mutant copyrights as the ground for the decision, then the courts
would likely have developed a more coherent body of law going forward.
And so, I think his textualism actually makes Dastar a less useful opinion
than it would have been had it been ground in a non-textual basis.
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CASES WITH THE GREATEST IMPACT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
Both the cases that I discussed have had important effects already. But
the case that I will identify as an outside bet for significance—and this is
very speculative—is a Lanham Act case that is not properly a trademark
case. It is a false advertising case; false advertising is litigated under the
Lanham Act but under the second part of Section 43(a). The case is the
Lexmark case about standing in a false advertising action. In Lexmark, the
Supreme Court endorsed a pretty general, and generally used, standing test,
looking both at the zone of interest and remoteness of harms. It probably
didn’t dramatically change false advertising claims, but Justice Scalia’s
reasoning suggests that the standard for standing was fully applicable to all
Lanham Act cases. And you are now seeing those standing arguments from
43(a)(1)(B) cases—false advertising cases—pop up in regular trademark
cases. For example, it was argued in the Slep-Tone case on Section 43(a)
actions involving digital goods in the Seventh Circuit, even though that
wasn’t the basis for the ultimate opinion. And there’s a recent Fourth Circuit
opinion, Bayer v. Belmora, on well-known marks, which addresses the
ability to protect marks that have never been used or registered in the United
States but which are well known elsewhere (in that case, in Mexico). The
Fourth Circuit decided the question by applying a Lexmark framework (and
the case is being pursued further, before the Supreme Court).
This litigation strategy of invoking Lexmark connects well to
developments in recent scholarly writing, most notably that of Rebecca
Tushnet of Georgetown. She argues that some of the limits that one finds in
Section 43(a) false advertising cases should be transposed to trademark
cases. This might bring in concepts like materiality. But it also makes
Lexmark a live argument. The Lexmark test gives judges plenty of scope to
work out what is a real and actionable “harm” to a trademark—for example,
what is a direct harm versus an indirect harm—and thus has the capacity to
shrink the scope of actions under Section 43(a), including the trademark part
as well as the false advertising part. So if I had to make a prediction of one
case, which at the moment, would have little effect but that actually might
be significant, I would predict Lexmark.

